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CALLING A TRUCE TO THE CRYPTO WARS: WHY
CONGRESS AND TECH COMPANIES MUST WORK
TOGETHER TO INTRODUCE NEW SOLUTIONS AND
LEGISLATION TO REGULATE ENCRYPTION
Liz Kaminski*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 2, 2015 at 10:59 A.M., Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife,
Tashfeen Malik, entered a conference room at the Inland Regional Center in
San Bernardino, California and opened fire.1 By the end of the attack,
Farook and his wife murdered fourteen people and left twenty-two people
seriously injured.2 Both attackers died during a gunfight with authorities
after being pursued for the brutal assault.3 Then considered “the third
deadliest attack on U.S. soil since Sept. 11, 2001,” law enforcement,
unsurprisingly, began an immediate investigation into the mass shooting.4
During the course of the investigation, law enforcement recovered three
cellphones used by the assailants.5 Only one cellphone remained intact, an
Apple iPhone 5C provided to Farook from his employer, the San Bernardino
County Department of Health.6 Apple’s encryption technology, however,
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1
Sari Horwitz & Joel Achenbach, Report Offers New Details on San Bernardino
Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nati
onal-security/report-offers-new-details-on-san-bernardino-terrorist-attack/2016/09/09/599ea
266-76be-11e6-b786-19d0cb1ed06c_story.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. Unfortunately, terrorism and mass shootings have continued since the writing of
this article. Therefore, the ranking of the San Bernardino shooting may not be accurate
considering recent events. See, e.g., Geoffrey Mohan, The Trigonometry of Terror: Why the
Las Vegas Shooting Was so Deadly, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-las-vegas-shooting-live-updates-the-trigonometry-of-terror-why-the-las-15070857
72-htmlstory.html.
5
Apple-FBI Battle over San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation: All the Details,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-apple-fbi20160219-htmlstory.html.
6
Id.
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protected the information contained in the iPhone.7 Unable to circumvent
the security measures protecting Farook’s iPhone, the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) turned to Apple for assistance in unlocking the phone.8
After about a month of meetings, discussions between Apple and the FBI
broke down.9 Once talks between the two parties collapsed, Magistrate
Judge Sheri Pym of the District of Central California ordered Apple to assist
the FBI in unlocking the phone on February 16, 2016.10 Judge Pym issued
the order pursuant to the All Writs Act (AWA).11 This Act allows federal
courts to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”12
Specifically, the order detailed that Apple should provide the FBI with
“reasonable technical assistance” to bypass Farook’s encrypted iPhone.13
Apple issued a letter in response to Judge Pym’s order that very same
day.14 Apple openly opposed the order claiming that forced compliance
would set a “dangerous precedent” for data security.15 Referring to
“technical assistance,” Apple stated, “[b]uilding a version of iOS that
bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And
while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case,
there is no way to guarantee such control.”16

7
Raoul Rañoa & Paresh Dave, How the iPhone’s Security Measures Work, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-g-how-the-iphone-s-securitymeasures-work-20160219-htmlstory.html.
8
Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino
Gunman’s iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/techno
logy/apple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html?_r=1.
9
Id.
10
Eric Lichtblau, Judge Tells Apple to Help Unlock iPhone Used by San Bernardino
Gunman, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/us/judge-tellsapple-to-help-unlock-san-bernardino-gunmans-iphone.html.
11
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
12
See In re An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a
Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2016).
13
The Central District of California ordered Apple’s reasonable technical assistance in
three respects: (1) bypassing the auto-erase function on the iPhone; (2) enabling the FBI to
submit passcodes to the iPhone; and (3) ensuring that the FBI would not be delayed by any
wait times between submitting passcodes. In re An Apple iPhone, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20543, at *2–3.
14
A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/cus
tomer-letter/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
15
Id.
16
Id.
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Apple’s opposition reignited a debate within the United States
regarding encryption.17 On the one hand, law enforcement faces increasing
investigative challenges due to sophisticated encryption protections. On the
other, private tech companies feel a responsibility to their users to provide
security in addition to privacy. This innate conflict between law
enforcement’s ability to investigate and tech companies’ promises of user
privacy has led to a standoff between law enforcement and private tech
companies.
This Comment will discuss the renewed “crypto war”—the debate
surrounding technology companies’ role in aiding law enforcement to obtain
information from encrypted devices.18 Part II will begin by exploring the
recent legal battles between Apple and the FBI as a case study of this conflict
between private, third-party companies that produce encryption and United
States law enforcement. Part III will then discuss the background of
cryptology (or cryptography) and the controversy that has continuously
surrounded private use of cryptology within the United States. Next, Part IV
will consider the current legislation relied upon by tech companies and the
government, and will analyze its applicability to today’s encryption
technology. Part V will then propose a possible solution—a commission
comprised of tech industry specialists, law enforcement, and other
government officials. Further, this Comment will present Israel as a case
study that the United States could possibly use as a model for encryption
regulations. Finally, this Comment concludes that a compromise between
law enforcement and private tech companies must be fostered in order to end
the “crypto wars” and create new legislation to regulate encryption.
II. APPLE VS. FBI: LEGAL BATTLES OVER COMPELLING PRIVATE, THIRD
PARTIES TO DECRYPT PRIVATE DEVICES
The recent legal battles between the FBI and Apple demonstrate the
struggles that the courts face in balancing law enforcement’s need for
information and the private tech industry’s need for ever-increasing
encryption security for individuals. For instance, Apple’s refusal to comply
with Judge Pym’s order to unlock Farook’s iPhone made news headlines
17

For an introductory discussion of the United States’s earlier “crypto wars,” see Andrea
Peterson, The ‘Crypto Wars’ of the 1990s Are Brewing Again in Washington, WASH. POST
(Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/10/the-cry
pto-wars-of-the-1990s-are-brewing-again-in-washington/.
18
The Fifth Amendment controversy surrounding law enforcement compelling
individual defendants to provide their password to decrypt protected information is beyond
the scope of this Comment. For a discussion involving the Fifth Amendment implications in
requiring defendants to provide their passwords for decryption, see, J. Riley Atwood,
Comment, The Encryption Problem: Why the Courts and Technology Are Creating a Mess
for Law Enforcement, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 407 (2015).
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during February 2016.19 Apple insisted that the court-compelled technical
assistance would create a “backdoor” in all Apple devices running similar
software.20 To comply with Judge Pym’s order, Apple needed to create and
install new “bad” code on Farook’s iPhone to override the phone’s current
“good” code.21 The “good” code improves security measures on the device
while the “bad” code diminishes or creates vulnerabilities in the security
measures on a device.22 By updating the iPhone’s operating system with
“bad” code, the current security system23 would become vulnerable,
allowing the FBI to successfully retrieve information from Farook’s
encrypted iPhone.24 Under this premise, Apple appealed Judge Pym’s order
compelling technical assistance on the high-profile Farook matter.25
Another Apple legal battle also grabbed headlines during winter 2016.26
On February 29, 2016, Judge Orenstein in the Eastern District of New York
ruled against the government’s motion to force Apple to extract information
from a drug dealer’s encrypted iPhone 5S, protected with a passcode.27
Judge Orenstein, who issued the ruling In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to
Assist, agreed with Apple’s argument that the AWA improperly applied to
19
See, e.g., Apple-FBI Battle over San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation: All the
Details, supra note 5.
20
See A Message to Our Customers, supra note 14. Although Apple referred to the San
Bernardino technical assistance order as forcing the company to create a “backdoor,” this in
a technical sense is not correct. A technical backdoor is when a manufacturer pre-equips
software or hardware with code that allows the manufacturer to access the information from
the device without the user’s permission. See Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What
You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get What it Needs in a Post-CALEA, CybersecurityCentric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599, 609–10 (2016).
21
See Pell, supra note 20, at 613.
22
Id.
23
Apple’s passcode feature provides iPhone users with the ability to protect information
using 256-bit encryption. See Rañoa & Dave, supra note 7. This encryption method produces
trillions of possible patterns. Id. Further, Apple provides users with a choice to completely
erase information found on the iPhone after several failed attempts to unlock the passcode.
Id.
24
iPhones have the inability to distinguish between “good code” and “bad code.” See
Pell, supra note 20, at 613.
25
Jonathan Chew, This Is Apple’s Next Move in its Fight with the FBI, FORTUNE (Mar.
2, 2016, 10:53 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/apple-appeal-fbi-iphone/.
26
See, e.g., Sarah Jeong, Judge James Orenstein Has Something to Say About the US
Government’s Decryption of iPhones, VICE: NEWS (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://news.vic
e.com/article/judge-james-orenstein-has-something-to-say-about-the-us-governments-decry
ption-of-iphones.
27
In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued
by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 354–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) [hereinafter, N.Y. Apple iPhone
Case]. Katie Benner & Joseph Goldstein, Apple Wins Ruling in New York iPhone Hacking
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/technology/applewins-ruling-in-new-york-iphone-hacking-order.html?_r=1. As of July 2016, the DOJ is
appealing Judge Orenstein’s decision. DOJ Continues Appeal for iPhone Data Case in New
York, FORTUNE (Apr. 8, 2016), EBSCOhost (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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compelling a private tech company in assisting law enforcement.28 Apple,
therefore, could not be compelled under this Act to provide technical
assistance in unlocking the device.29 This decision marked a major
divergence from earlier decisions because no other court had ruled in favor
of Apple over law enforcement’s use of the AWA.30
The facts in both the San Bernardino case and the New York case bore
two major similarities. First, the New York case, like the San Bernardino
case, involved an encrypted iPhone.31 Second, the government in both cases
used the AWA as its legal basis for compelling Apple to unlock the iPhone.32
This made In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist a foremost victory for
Apple, and made the FBI’s argument to compel Apple to unlock Farook’s
iPhone under the AWA vulnerable to attack on appeal.33
Apple, however, did not get the opportunity to attack the validity of the
FBI’s use of the AWA regarding Farook’s iPhone. Ultimately, the FBI
withdrew its motion to compel Apple’s technical assistance on March 28,
2016.34 Instead, the FBI figured out a way to circumvent the encryption
protecting Farook’s iPhone with the help of anonymous third-party hackers
and no longer needed Apple’s assistance.35
The FBI revealed little information regarding the flaws in the iOS 9
software’s security measures to Apple or the public.36 The hack used for the
San Bernardino matter only unlocked iPhone 5Cs running the iOS 9.37
28

See Benner & Goldstein, supra note 27; see also infra Part IV.B and accompanying

text.

29

text.

See Benner & Goldstein, supra note 27; see also infra Part IV.B and accompanying

30
Previously, at least seventy orders compelling Apple to unlock phones had been
issued. See Benner, supra note 27.
31
Sarah Jeong, The Convoluted Logic Behind Apple’s ‘Obstruction’ of Law
Enforcement, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 8, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/
en_au/read/doj-seeks-to-overturn-new-york-iphone-case.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Kate Sheehy, FBI Breaks into San Bernardino Gunman’s iPhone, Ending Court Case,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/03/28/fbi-breaks-into-san-bernardinogunmans-iphone-ending-court-case/.
35
Id.
36
In January 2017, the FBI released heavily redacted documents in response to a lawsuit
from USA TODAY and two other news organizations seeking information about the FBI’s
ability to circumvent Farook’s iPhone security measures. See Elizabeth Weise, FBI Blacks
out Most Details on Hack of Terrorist’s iPhone, USA TODAY (Jan. 7, 2017 10:48 A.M.),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/01/07/fbi-iphone-terrorist-san-bernardino-s
yed-rizwan-farook-foia-lawsuit-ap-vice-usa-today/96280458/. These documents showed
little besides boilerplate language. Id. The documents did not reveal how much the FBI paid
outside sources to hack into the iPhone or the sources. Id.
37
Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San
Bernardino iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
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Nonetheless, some critics and Apple itself claimed that the FBI should
release the information regarding the vulnerability so the security issue can
be fixed.38 In April of 2016, the FBI maintained that it needed the
vulnerability in the software for a few more months before it would publicly
disclose the system’s issues.39
While the San Bernardino battle may be over, the war over encryption
between tech companies and law enforcement persists. In Fall 2017, Apple
introduced the iPhone 8 and iPhone X equipped with iOS 11, which is
expected to make seizing data from an iPhone far more difficult.40 Encrypted
data on Apple devices will, therefore, continue to cause difficulties for law
enforcement.41
As encryption technology advances to protect users’ privacy, law
enforcement continues to struggle with obtaining encrypted information and
courts continue to grapple with outdated legislation. Congress must create
new laws to provide law enforcement with the ability to obtain encrypted
information to strike the balance between two competing ideas of security:
(1) the security that strong encryption affords to private individuals, the
government, and industries such as the financial or healthcare sectors, and
(2) the security of the United States against threats such as terrorist attacks
and criminal enterprises.
III. CRYPTOLOGY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
A. Primer on Cryptology
While encryption and decryption methods have drastically changed
over time, the idea behind cryptography42 remains substantially the same.43
In the classic example, Alice wants to send Bob a message that only Bob can

national-security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-iphon
e/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.ebd9df8cc
ee8.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Andy Greenberg, Apple’s iOS 11 Will Make it Even Harder for Cops to Extract Your
Data, WIRED (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/apples-ios-11-will-make-it-eve
n-harder-for-cops-to-extract-your-data/. Even Siri now comes equipped with end-to-end
encryption. iOS 11, APPLE.COM, https://www.apple.com/ios/ios-11/.
41
See Greenberg, supra note 40.
42
Throughout this Comment, the words “cryptography” and “cryptology” are used
interchangeably.
43
This idea of using a “secret language” can be traced back to the Roman Empire. BERTJAAP KOOPS, THE CRYPTO CONTROVERSY: A KEY CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 34
(1999). By using a substitution method, Julius Caesar allegedly used a Caesar cipher, which
used a key of three—meaning that to encrypt a message one would use the letter that occurs
three letters after the actual letter (A would be D). Id.
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read.44 Alice, the sender, transforms her message into a different, secret
language that turns the message into jumble so that any interceptors are
unable to read the message—this is encryption.45 When Bob receives Alice’s
message, he uses his cipher or key to translate the jumbled message back into
an understandable one—this is decryption.46
While cryptography was originally done by hand, by World War I
machines were being used to encrypt and decrypt messages using the
“substitution method” of encryption.47 During World War II, cryptography
became extremely important for the military.48 For instance, United States
cryptologists managed to build a replica of the Japanese cryptograph
machine and used it to break the Japanese’s coded messages throughout the
war.49 After World War II, the military and United States intelligence
agencies continued to research cryptography.50 The United States
established the secret National Security Agency a.k.a. “No Such Agency”
(NSA),51 which concentrated on developing cryptography.52 The NSA
primarily focused on two areas of research: (1) creating encryption codes
that could not be broken to maintain the security of government information
and (2) gathering and decoding foreign intelligence.53 By the 1970s,
however, researchers outside the NSA were making headway in the field of
cryptology and were using computers to encrypt and decrypt data.54 IBM
introduced a “symmetric system” for encryption that allowed encryption and
decryption to use the same key.55
Encryption methods have continued to develop and uses have expanded
into the private sector, like Apple’s encryption technology. Apple uses a

44
See STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT–SAVING
PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 5–6 (2001).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
The machines developed would automatically substitute letters for numbers and
symbols and be able to transpose encrypted messages. See Koops, supra note 43, at 34.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
The NSA was created in 1952 under President Truman with the purpose of gathering
intelligence and securing government information. See LEVY, supra note 44, at 13–14. The
agency was known for being very secretive and rarely discussed research publicly, so by the
early 1970s, some who were in the know would refer to the agency as “No Such Agency.” Id.
52
See Koops, supra note 43, at 35.
53
The NSA organized itself into two major divisions. See LEVY, supra note 44, at 14.
Communication Security, or COMSEC, created encryption codes while Communications
Intelligence, or COMINT, intercepted foreign electronic information and decoded that
information. Id.
54
See Koops, supra note 43, at 35–36.
55
Id. at 35–36, 42–43.
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“bit” encryption method for its devices.56 For instance, the security measures
installed on Farook’s iPhone used a 256-bit encryption method.57 This
method substitutes data on the iPhone and stores the data as a series of “o’s”
and “1’s”.58 The smartphone then uses a unique number 256 bits long as the
key to encrypt the data.59 The more bits there are, the more possible keys
there are to unlock the phone so a 256-bit encryption provides for trillions of
patterns that could be the key to decrypting the data.60 Apple does not keep
a copy of the “key” for each iPhone, and without this key, not even Apple
can unscramble the data.61
By setting a passcode on the iPhone, the iPhone’s data can only be
decrypted and accessed by entering the passcode.62 The passcode has
additional security features that force a wait time after several failed attempts
at opening the iPhone and provides users with the ability to permanently
delete information after ten failed passcode attempts.63 These security
measures prevented the FBI from using a “brute force attack” to unlock
Farook’s iPhone.64 A brute force attack on encrypted data occurs when a
program runs every possible combination for the key until it finds the
combination used to decrypt the data.65 Since the FBI could not use a brute
force program, the key to an iPhone would likely not be ascertained unless
some other security measure in the iPhone was exploited.66
B. The “Original” Crypto Wars
Long before Apple’s 256-bit encryption method, United States law
enforcement had concerns about encryption technology and its ability to
retrieve encrypted information.67 During the 1990s, two major encryption
issues developed in the United States.68 Concerned with national security,
law enforcement pursued regulations regarding: (1) the exportation of
encryption products and (2) the ability to aid law enforcement in recovering

56

See Rañoa, supra note 7.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See Rañoa, supra note 7.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See id.
67
Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, A Brief History of U.S. Encryption Policy,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/04/19/a-brief-hi
story-of-u-s-encryption-policy/.
68
Id.
57
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encrypted information.69
With the rise of the Internet, the United States felt as if it had to control
encryption technology exports to keep them out of the hands of possible
foreign enemies.70 Through legislation already in place,71 Clinton’s
Administration classified encryption products under the Commerce Control
List giving the United States Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Export
Control the ability to regulate encryption exports.72 Today, the Department
of Commerce continues to regulate encryption; however, the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) now oversees export controls.73 As domestic
regulations regarding encryption products do not exist within the United
States, the BIS remains mainly responsible for regulating encryption
products exported on an international level.74 For instance, the encryption
regulations prohibit exporting encryption products to terrorist-supporting
countries.75
While the United States has international export regulations, regulating
encryption within the United States has presented unique difficulties. Law
enforcement agencies wanted to establish legal procedures to receive thirdparty assistance in decrypting information.76 In the early 1990s, law
enforcement approached this issue by introducing the concept of a “key
escrow.”77 The NSA initially proposed that tech companies voluntarily
install a “Clipper chip” into the technological network for phones.78 The
installed chip would encrypt data installed on the phones for its users and
would make a copy of the user’s key.79 The two parts of the “key” would
then be held in an “escrow” by two agencies, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology and the Treasury Department’s Automated
Systems Division, until law enforcement obtained a valid court order to

69

Id.
Id.
71
For example see, the International Emergency Economic Power Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(2012), the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012), and the Export
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2410 (2012). MARTIN CHARLES GOLUMBIC, FIGHTING
TERROR ONLINE: THE CONVERGENCE OF SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE LAW 80–81, n.67
(2008).
72
GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 81.
73
Policy Guidance, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SECURITY, https://www.bis.doc.gov/ind
ex.php/policy-guidance/. (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
74
GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 81–82.
75
See 15 C.F.R. § 740 Supp. 1 (2016). Currently, there are four countries the United
States deemed terrorist-supporting countries: Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See 15
C.F.R. § 740 Supp. 1 (2016).
76
See generally, Karsten & West, supra note 67.
77
Id.
78
See id.; see also KOOPS, supra note 43, at 109.
79
See KOOPS, supra note 43, at 109.
70
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acquire the information contained on the encrypted phone.80 After obtaining
the court order to acquire the information, the key’s two parts would be
released to law enforcement.81
In 1993, President Clinton introduced the “Clipper chip” concept to the
public through the voluntary Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).82 The
EES faced heavy criticism from privacy advocates who believed a key
escrow would ultimately become a mandatory control, meaning that the
voluntary installation would one day become a mandatory installation.83
Further, technologists believed that a key escrow would create
vulnerabilities in encryption security that hackers could exploit.84 By 1997,
the NSA abandoned pursuing the EES system.85
Congress, however, continued to attempt to address law enforcement’s
concerns over obtaining encrypted information. Both the Senate and the
House drafted competing bills that dealt with regulating encryption
domestically in the 1990s—many included some type of key escrow or key
recovery policy.86 Although discussed and drafted, Congress never adopted
the various proposals due to the key escrow policies that many bills
contained.87 The hesitation to adopt a full-blown key escrow derived from
the fact that these systems create major security risks for encryption.88 In
addition, the inherent complexity and astronomical costs of building a key
escrow system made employing the escrow system difficult.89
80

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. Documents showed that federal agencies contemplated that there would be a point
that a voluntary system would not be viable, and a mandatory policy would need to be
implicated. Id.
84
See generally Peterson, supra note 17 (“[I]f the government has a secret backdoor into
a technical system, what’s to stop a malicious hacker from finding it?”). For a discussion of
the vulnerabilities found within the EES, see Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed
Encryption Standard, CRYPTO.COM, http://www.crypto.com/papers/eesproto.pdf. (last visited
Jan. 13, 2017).
85
See KOOPS, supra note 43, at 109.
86
See id. at 111–12. The bills included: the Secure Public Networks Act introduced by
Senators Kerrey, McCain, and Hollings, which promoted the use of a key escrow policy that
law enforcement would have the ability to access; the Security and Freedom through
Encryption Act (SAFE) introduced in the House by Representative Goodlatte, and later
amended by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to include a key escrow
policy (a competing version of this bill, amended by the House Commerce Committee,
mandated that the government may not impose a key escrow policy; however, these two
conflicting versions of the bill made it “unfit for voting.”); and the E-Privacy Act that would
create a National Electronic Technologies (NET) Center to assist law enforcement. Id.
87
See id.
88
Peter Swire, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 436
(2012).
89
Id. at 437.
81
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The United States examined alternative encryption control methods to
a key escrow such as installing encryption products with technical
“backdoors” or, rather, pre-installed software that allows the manufacturer
to access encrypted information without the user’s permission.90 Yet,
backdoors also faced criticism because the encryption producers have no
way to ensure that only “good guys”—law enforcement enforcing a search
warrant—maintain an exclusive entrance.91 “Bad guys,” including hackers
intending to steal information, could exploit the intentional vulnerability.92
After the mounting disapproval over domestic encryption regulations to aid
law enforcement, the United States government abandoned the endeavor.93
Consequently, an open question remains regarding encryption producers’
role in aiding law enforcement within the United States.
C.

“Going Dark”: Challenges Faced by Today’s Law Enforcement

While law enforcement had no legal means tailored to compel
assistance from encryption producers, other agencies within the United
States’ government continued programs aimed at weakening strong
encryption products such as the NSA.94 When Edward Snowden, a former
NSA contractor, defected in 2013, he revealed to the world documents that
showed the NSA conducted a secret program called “Bullrun” to decrypt
data within the United States.95 Until Snowden revealed this information,
the NSA kept its capabilities to decrypt digital information a closely guarded
secret.96
Once the secret leaked that the NSA had decryption spying capabilities
in 2013, tech companies like Apple started pushing the bounds of encryption
by pre-installing its products with “end-to-end encryption.”97 End-to-end
encryption gives only the sender and recipient the key to unlock the data
90
Parker Higgins, On the Clipper Chip’s Birthday, Looking Back on Decades of Key
Escrow Failures, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2015, 1:07 PM), https://www.eff
.org/deeplinks/2015/04/clipper-chips-birthday-looking-back-22-years-key-escrow-failures;
see also Pell, supra note 20.
91
Swire, supra note 88, at 433.
92
Id.
93
See Higgins, supra note 90.
94
Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encry
ption.html?pagewanted=2&_r=3.
95
Id. A key feature of the Bullrun program was that Internet companies voluntarily
cooperated with the NSA. Id. For instance, the NSA uses the Sigint Enabling Project to
incentivize tech companies to “covertly influence and/or overtly leverage” designs to make
them “exploitable” and had spent more than $250 million a year on the program. Id. The
NSA had capabilities including having an American manufacturer actually install a backdoor
onto a computer being shipped to a foreign intelligence target. Id.
96
Id.
97
See Peterson, supra note 17.
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making it highly secure.98 In its approach to privacy statement, Apple
emphasized that end-to-end encryption does not allow the company to
decrypt a user’s message when in transit between devices.99 Apple has also
stated that regarding “all devices running iOS 8.0 and later versions, Apple
is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically
sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the
encryption key.”100 Since end-to-end encryption has been introduced, law
enforcement has become increasingly nervous that this encryption
technology will shelter criminals and terrorists, thus putting the United
States’s public safety and national security at risk.101
Stronger end-to-end encryption products mean challenges for law
enforcement; however, advances in this type of encryption technology also
have many benefits.102 Strong encryption benefits every private individual—
not just criminals or terrorists—as encryption is used to protect financial
information, healthcare information, government information, military data,
and data from intelligence agencies.103 For instance, with more than fiftyone percent of United States adults using online banking today,104 powerful
encryption helps protect this sensitive information from being hacked or
stolen.105 Without powerful encryption, many online banking or financial
transfers might be vulnerable to fraudulent transactions or cyber-attacks.106
While the public reaps benefits from encryption, strong encryption
hinders law enforcement investigations, and even prosecuting criminal
behavior. When bad actors, such as terrorists, use encryption to hide
activities and conceal evidence of criminal activity, a “digital crime scene”
98

Id.
Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-toprivacy/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
100
LEGAL PROCESS GUIDELINES, APPLE 10 (June 23, 2017), https://www.apple.com/
legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf.
101
See HOUSE HOMELAND SEC. COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REP., GOING DARK, GOING
FORWARD: A PRIMER ON THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE 10 (2016), https://homeland.house.gov
/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Staff-Report-Going-Dark-Going-Forward.pdf
[hereinafter
HOMELAND SEC. REP.].
102
A dual use product, such as encryption, can be used for both military and peaceful,
civil purposes. See KOOPS, supra note 43, at 98.
103
See HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101 at 7.
104
Id. at 8.
105
Id. at 8–9.
106
Id. For example, seven Iranian hackers were indicted in March 2016 for systematically
attacking targets including Bank of America, the New York Stock Exchange, Capital One and
ING, and PNC Bank, which “stopped hundreds of thousands of customers from accessing
their accounts and cost the businesses millions of dollars as they raced to protect their servers.”
Tom Winters & Tracy Connor, Iranians Charged with Cyber Attacks on U.S. Banks, Dam,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2016, 10:56 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iranianscharged-hacking-attacks-u-s-banks-dam-n544801.
99
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is created, but is unreachable by law enforcement investigators and
prosecutors.107 For example, the Office of the District Attorney for New
York County cited 175 cases between September 2014 and March 2016 in
which the office struggled to obtain evidence because the investigators could
not access digital information from encrypted devices.108 Law enforcement
agencies like the FBI cannot access the “digital crime scene” so they face
“going dark.”109
Former FBI Director James Comey described “going dark” as the
“phenomenon in which law enforcement personnel have the ‘legal authority
to intercept and access communication and information pursuant to court
order,’ but ‘lack the technical ability to do so.’”110 Director Comey also
understands the competing interests at stake:
We must ensure both the fundamental right of people to engage in
private communications as well as the protection of the public.
One of the bedrock principles upon which we rely to guide us is
the principle of judicial authorization: that if an independent judge
finds reason to believe that certain private communications
contain evidence of a crime, then the government can conduct a
limited search for that evidence. For example, by having a neutral
arbiter—the judge—evaluate whether the government’s evidence
satisfies the appropriate standard, we have been able to protect the
public and safeguard citizens’ constitutional rights. . . . We would
like to emphasize that the Going Dark problem is, at base, one of
technological choices and capability.111
Comey insists that law enforcement is not looking to expand
surveillance capabilities.112 Law enforcement merely wants the opportunity
to obtain encrypted information for investigations pursuant to a legal
authority.113
Others in law enforcement have acknowledged similar “going dark”
problems with obtaining encrypted information. Former New York Police
Department (“NYPD”) Police Commissioner Bill Bratton found that Apple’s
refusal to unlock Farook’s iPhone was a display of “corporate
irresponsibility.”114 During a press conference with Bratton, Manhattan’s
107

See HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 10.
Id.
109
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
110
HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 5 (quoting former FBI Director James
Comey).
111
The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy Before H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 11–12 (2016) (statement of James B. Comey, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigations).
112
Id. at 12.
113
Id.
114
Graham Rayman & Leonard Greene, NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton, Manhattan
108
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District Attorney, Cyrus Vance, displayed numerous inaccessible, encrypted
iPhones on a table to reporters and expressed frustration over the dilemma
by stating, “[i]t’s very difficult to explain to a victim of crime that we can’’t
get evidence because of cellphone technology.”115 NYPD Deputy
Commissioner, John Miller, agreed, stating, “now totally encrypted devices
like the Apple iPhone, cannot be penetrated even with a search warrant from
a judge.”116 Similarly, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Captain Chris Cahhal
asserted that an encrypted iPhone makes a “nice paperweight,” because the
department has no way to access the information encrypted on those
devices.117 Hillar C. Moore, III, the District Attorney for East Baton Rouge,
acknowledges that not all encrypted phone data may lead to an arrest or
prosecution; however, he believes that law enforcement should have the
capability to look for clues.118 These statements demonstrate that both
federal law enforcement, like the FBI, and local law enforcement are facing
a massive “going dark” problem.
Despite this “going dark” problem, Apple continues to resist assisting
law enforcement. Apple requires the government to present a warrant or
subpoena for information requests.119 Apple also specifically stated that it
cannot perform data extractions on iOS 8 and newer software as it does not
have the encryption key.120
A study conducted by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at
Harvard University supports the theory that law enforcement can obtain
DA Cyrus Vance Blast Apple’s Unwillingness to Unlock Criminals’ iPhones, NY DAILY NEWS
(Feb. 18, 2016, 3:43 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bill-bratton-blasts-appleencryption-stance-article-1.2536506.
115
Id. For example, the Manhattan District Attorney’s office has been stalled in
collecting any evidence from the main suspect’s encrypted iPhone for the murder of a Hofstra
graduate student due to the phone’s password protection despite the existence of a search
warrant. Shayna Jacobs, iPhone of Suspect in Hofstra Grad Student Murder Inaccessible to
Prosecutors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/iphone-suspecthofstra-grad-student-murder-locked-da-article-1.3492123 (last updated Sept. 14, 2017, 4:49
AM).
116
Eric Geller, Top NYPD Official Says Apple’s Encryption Helps Murderers and
Kidnappers, DAILY DOT (Mar. 7, 2016, 9:35 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/appleiphone-encryption-nypd-john-miller-kidnappers-murderers/.
117
Kate Mather & James Queally, The Federal Government Is Fighting Apple for
Something the Police Want Too, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.latimes
.com/business/technology/la-me-apple-police-20160226-story.html.
118
Mather, supra note 117. Moore hit a dead end in an open murder investigation due to
an encrypted iPhone. Id. In April 2015, an unknown assailant murdered an eight-months
pregnant woman named Brittney Mills in her Baton Rouge home. Id. Investigators obtained
a warrant for Mills’ iPhone, but Mills’ iPhone ran iOS 8 or later version of software. Id.
Apple, therefore, refused to crack the device. Id.
119
Government Information Requests, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/governmen
t-information-requests/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
120
See Legal Process Guidelines, supra note 100.
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information in ways other than compelling assistance from non-government
tech companies like Apple.121 Law enforcement may use methods involving
metadata to mine for information122 or malware to catch data before
encryption.123 Despite these alternative methods for law enforcement
surveillance,124 law enforcement still faces enormous challenges in obtaining
information from the “digital crime scene”125 without a proper legal
foundation.
IV. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPELLING THIRD PARTIES
TO BYPASS ENCRYPTION
Without any guidance from Congress, courts have struggled to apply
an appropriate legal framework to compel third party encryption producers
to assist law enforcement in obtaining information related to open
investigations. Courts, like the District Court for the Central District of
California, have used existing wiretapping legislation and extraordinary writ
measures to compel aid from non-governmental third parties like Apple;126
however, neither existing wiretapping legislation nor extraordinary writ
measures are appropriate in compelling a completely private encryption
producer to decrypt a user’s encrypted information for law enforcement.127

121
See MATT OLSEN ET AL., DON’T PANIC. MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK”
DEBATE 2–3 (2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_
Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf [hereinafter BERKMAN STUDY] (noting that the “going
dark” metaphor does not accurately describe current law enforcement conditions). See also
Pell, supra note 20, at 625–27.
122
See id. at 3, 9. Metadata is not encrypted, and not likely to become encrypted. Id.
Metadata can reveal information such as email addresses and mobile device location. Id.
Since metadata is plaintext, this is a source surveillance information for law enforcement. Id.
123
See Pell, supra note 20, 635 n.130, 641–42. (citing Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Used Hacking
Software Decade Before iPhone Fight, N.Y. TIMES (April 13, 2016), http://mobile.nytimes.
com/2016/04/14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10-years-ago-files-show.html?_r
=2 (discussing how the FBI remotely installed malware on a computer as a part of criminal
wiretap in order to circumvent encryption)). In order to gain access to encrypted information,
law enforcement may hack a smartphone and install malware designed to catch voice
communications and keystrokes before encryption. Id.
124
Since law enforcement has new alternatives for surveying criminal activity, Peter
Swire believes that today is the “golden age for surveillance.” Swire, supra note 88, at 460–
73. The phrase “golden age for surveillance” refers to the idea that law enforcement’s
surveillance activities are greatly enhanced compared to earlier periods of time. Id. For a
discussion on the idea that technology has advanced to provide law enforcement with more
means to survey the population, see Swire, supra note 88, at 460–73.
125
See supra text accompanying note 107.
126
See In re An Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a
Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20543 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2016).
127
See infra Part IV.A–B.
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A. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
Cannot Reasonably Be Applied to Today’s Encryption Products
Law enforcement has considered Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) as one avenue of fitting today’s encryption
producers within a legislative framework.128 Congress enacted CALEA so
that law enforcement authorities with a proper court order could
“intercept . . . communications.”129 Under CALEA, telecommunication
carriers, telephone companies, and telecommunication manufacturers must
have built-in surveillance systems that law enforcement can access and
monitor. 130
The capability requirements under CALEA are subject to exceptions.
For instance, “information services” are exempt from CALEA’s assistance
requirements.131 This Act defines “information services” as “the offering of
a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving,
utilizing,
or
making
available
information
via
telecommunications.”132 Further, CALEA carves out special measures for
encryption stating that “telecommunication carriers”133 are not required to
decrypt any information or communication unless the carrier provided the
encryption and has the information available to decrypt the data.134 CALEA
remains silent on whether “information service[s]” have any role in aiding
law enforcement with encryption.
American Council on Education v. FCC solidifies the interpretation that
CALEA’s statutory language exempts information services from assisting
law enforcement.135 In American Council, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that
CALEA’s language clearly limits law enforcement from compelling
information services to comply with controls such as installing monitoring
devices.136 The D.C. Circuit ultimately concluded that broadband providers
fell within CALEA’s scope because broadband providers fit the definition of

128

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–10 (2012).
See id. § 1002(a)(1).
130
Swire, supra note 88, at 421–22.
131
47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A) (2012).
132
Id. § 1001(6).
133
Id. § 1001(8)(A) (emphasis added). “The term ‘telecommunications carrier’ (A)
means a person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic
communications as a common carrier for hire.” Id.
134
Id. § 1002(b)(3).
135
See Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
136
Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(C)(i)).
129
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“telecommunication carrier” rather than “information service.”137 Although
the D.C. Circuit broadened CALEA’s scope to include broadband providers,
companies like Apple remain outside CALEA’s purview.138
Apple deals in convergence technology,139 and cannot be considered
either a broadband provider or a telecommunication carrier. Judge
Orenstein, the presiding judge for In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist,
reasoned that CALEA applies only to “telecommunication carriers,” and
specifically exempts certain areas within the technology industry.140 Judge
Orenstein concluded that Apple falls within the technology industry
exemption and would not be considered a telecommunication carrier because
Apple produces convergence technology.141
Therefore, law enforcement cannot rely on CALEA to compel Apple to
unlock iPhones and override security devices. Nor could CALEA compel
any other encryption producer that does not fit the statutory definition of
“telecommunication carrier” to assist in obtaining encrypted information. In
addition, CALEA has not been updated in over twenty years to reflect
modern technology.142 Without some type of amendment to CALEA,
devices with encryption protections, like the iPhone, will remain out of law
enforcement’s reach.143
B. The AWA Is an Extraordinary Measure to Use Against Private
Third-Party Companies
Law enforcement has also utilized the “AWA” to compel third party
encryption producers to assist with decrypting information. While
137
See id. at 232–36 (emphasizing that the standard of review was extremely deferential
to the FCC’s “reasonable” interpretation of the phrase “telecommunications carrier” in the
CALEA).
138
“CALEA is not viewed as applying to data contained on smart phones. . . .” See Peter
T. King, Remembering the Lessons of 9/11: Preserving Tools and Authorities in the Fight
Against Terrorism, 41 J. LEGIS. 173, 178 (2015).
139
See Christy Roland, The Complete and Modern Guide to Technology Convergence,
AT&T DEVELOPER PROGRAM (May 15, 2017, 11:48 AM), https://developer.att.com/blog/tech
nology-convergence (“[A]n example of technology convergence is smartphones, which
combine the functionality of a telephone, a camera, a music player, and a digital personal
assistant.”). Convergence technology is when a single device contains two or more different
technological capabilities, i.e., a cell phone that can also be used as a camera. See Bill Ward,
The Impact of Technology Convergence, DIGITILIST MAG. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.digita
listmag.com/innovation/2014/08/06/impact-of-technology-convergence-01257734. “”
140
N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 354–55.
141
Id. at 356–57.
142
See Matthew Braga, The FBI Is at War with Apple Because it Couldn’t Change
Wiretap Law, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 1, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/ar
ticle/z434z4/calea-my-old-friend.. Congress passed CALEA in 1994. Id. ’
143
Around 2009, the FBI and the Department of Justice discussed amending CALEA to
encompass technology like smartphones and e-mail. See King, supra note 138, at 178–79.
These proposed amendments, however, were never sent to Congress. Id.
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considered an extraordinary writ, the AWA has been invoked at least sixty
times since 2008 to compel Apple and Google to provide assistance in
obtaining information from devices.144 While law enforcement has
successfully compelled private third party assistance under the AWA,145 law
enforcement cannot use the AWA to properly compel Apple to undermine
its own security features.
Passed in 1789, the AWA permits federal courts to issue “all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law.”146 The AWA can be used to compel
private third parties to provide technical assistance in certain situations.147
In United States v. New York Telephone Company, the New York Telephone
Company resisted an order to provide technical assistance to the FBI to
install pen registers148 by refusing to lease the telephones lines the FBI
needed to install pen registers.149 The Supreme Court found that the AWA
may be applied to third parties as an auxiliary measure when that third party
is “in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper
administration of justice.”150 According to the FBI, the New York Telephone
Company’s own property, the physical telephone lines, were likely being
used to further criminal activity.151 The Court ruled that the FBI properly
invoked the AWA because the New York Telephone Company was closely
related to the matter being investigated by the FBI.152 Further, the Court
concluded that the technical assistance the order required—to install pen
registers—was in no way burdensome to the New York Telephone Company
because the company simply had to provide the FBI with access to the
lines.153 Finally, the Court found that the New York Telephone’s Company
assistance was necessary because the court order to tap the lines could not
144
Eliza Sweren-Becker, This Map Shows How the Apple-FBI Fight Was About Much
More Than One Phone, ACLU BLOG (Mar. 30, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
privacy-technology/internet-privacy/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fight-was-about-much-more
-one-phone?redirect=blog/speak-freely/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fight-was-about-much-m
ore-one-phone.
145
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Feds Say Apple Has Unlocked Suspects’’ iPhones “At
Least” 70 Times in the Past, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 26, 2015), https://motherboard.vice
.com/en_us/article/4xagvq/feds-say-apple-has-unlocked-suspects-iphones-at-least-70-timesin-the-past.
146
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
147
The Act itself does not identify examples; however, case law has identified situations
when courts may issue this extraordinary writ. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434
U.S. 159 (1977).
148
Pen registers are a type of wiretapping device. Id. at n.1.
149
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 161–63.
150
Id. at 174–75.
151
Id. at 174–78.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 174–75.
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be carried out without access to the physical lines.154
Under New York Telephone Company’s reasoning, law enforcement
has attempted to leverage the AWA in a similar manner against companies
like Apple. In In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist, law enforcement
tried to use the AWA as an auxiliary measure to CALEA to compel Apple’s
technical assistance in circumventing security measures in an encrypted
iPhone.155 This argument, however, initially failed on its face because Apple
is a technology company that falls outside the scope of CALEA.156
Therefore, ordering Apple’s assistance to decrypt an iPhone could not be a
proper auxiliary measure to CALEA.157 In addition, Judge Orenstein
concluded that the AWA could not be used as a “gap filler”158 for holes in
CALEA because CALEA’s legislative scheme is so comprehensive that it
implicitly prevents imposing orders onto private third parties like Apple.159
The executive branch cannot use the AWA “to achieve a legislative goal that
Congress has considered and rejected.”160
Judge Orenstein also distinguished the facts of In re Order Requiring
Apple, Inc. to Assist from those presented in New York Telephone
Company.161 First, unlike a telephone carrier that owns telephone lines,
Apple’s property was not used in the commission of a crime; rather, the
154

Id.
See N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 352–57.
156
See supra note 138, and accompanying text.
157
See N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 354, 360–64. Arguably, CALEA
absolves a company like Apple from having any responsibility to assist law enforcement. See
id.
158
Id. at 353, 357–58. “Gap filler” refers to the fact that Congress cannot anticipate every
circumstance a court may act to “properly . . . vindicate the rights of parties before it.” Id.
Therefore, the AWA acts as a piece of legislation for courts to perform their duty even when
there is gap within legislation as long as that gap is “agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.” Id. The AWA’s statutory language of “usages” and “principles” compels the
conclusion that the order must not merely be consistent with the law, but be “consonant with
both the manner in which the laws were developed . . . and the manner in which the laws have
been interpreted and implemented.” Id.
159
Id. at 354.
160
N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 360; CALEA’s history reveals that
Congress considered whether the CALEA should be expanded to cover technology such as
the iPhone, but have yet to reach a consensus. See id. n.25; see also In re Order Requiring
Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by this Court, No. 15-mc01902, 2015 WL 5920207, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015).
Further, the FBI has not sought to use the legislature as a means to deal with the issue
of encryption. See James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Statement Before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.fbi
.gov/news/testimony/threats-to-the-homeland (“The United States government is actively
engaged with private companies to ensure they understand the public safety and national
security risks that result from malicious actors’ use of their encrypted products and services.
However, the administration is not seeking legislation at this time.”).
161
N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 364.
155
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criminal used his own property, which distanced Apple’s role from the
matter.162 Further, while the telecommunication industry, such as phone
companies, is a heavily regulated utility “with a duty to serve the public,”163
Apple remains a private business and, like any other private entity, has no
duty to serve the public.164
Unlike the New York Telephone Company, Apple would also bear a
much larger burden by having an order of compelled technical assistance
enforced against it. Apple is a private company that owes a duty to its
shareholders—not the United States government or law enforcement.165 The
technical assistance the FBI requested would require Apple to undermine its
own security measures, which would tarnish the Apple brand.166 Further,
Apple is not in the line of work to bypass its own security measures and this
act would be offensive to the business.167 Apple would also have to dedicate
many hours to unlocking the device.168 Thus, if the government continued
with requests to compel Apple to unlock iPhones on a massive scale, Apple’s
productivity would be significantly impacted.169
Finally, “necessity” also failed to support the argument that an
extraordinary writ should be issued to compel Apple to bypass its own
software.170 The FBI contradicted itself throughout the case by arguing that
it could only decrypt the iPhone with Apple’s help, while later claiming that
there were circumstances when law enforcement had the capabilities to
decrypt a specific phone without the help of private third parties.171
Therefore, Judge Orenstein concluded that the government did not present
the pressing necessity needed to issue an extraordinary writ.172
Not all courts have followed In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to
Assist’s reasoning;173 however, Judge Orenstein’s opinion provides
162

Id. at 364–65.
United States v. N.Y., Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977).
164
N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 364–65.
165
Id. at 369.
166
Id.
167
Id. Apple prides itself as being a producer of secure products and Apple is “committed
to keeping [] personal information safe.” See Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.
apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
168
N.Y. Apple iPhone Case, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 370–71.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 375.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
See In re Order Requiring [XXX], Inc., No. 14 Mag. 2258, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
154743, at *1–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2014). Compared to Judge Orenstein’s reasoning, In re
Order Requiring XXX, Inc. reasons that the AWA does apply in compelling third-party tech
companies to decrypt devices for law enforcement. See id. This decision, made prior to
Judge Orenstein’s ruling, simply concluded a tech company must assist in unlocking a
cellphone as it was required in N.Y. Tel. Co. See id.
163
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ammunition for Apple in future litigation. As made obvious by In re Order
Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist, compelling a private tech company to decrypt
a device is not analogous to compelling a phone company to provide access
to phone lines so the FBI can install wiretapping devices.174 Therefore, law
enforcement will likely have much more difficulty in utilizing the AWA to
compel assistance from encryption producers in the future.
V. CONGRESS MUST ADDRESS A TECHNOLOGICAL COMPANY’S ROLE IN
WORKING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT
A. Prior to Legislating, Congress Must First Better Understand
Encryption Today
Congress must be proactive by introducing new legislation or updating
current legislation to ensure that law enforcement has the capability to
receive assistance from encryption producers.175 On February 29, 2016, two
Senators introduced the Digital Security Commission Act of 2016.176
Proposed by House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul and
Senator Mark Warner, the bill called to form a bipartisan177 National
174

See supra Part IV.A–B.
Michael McCaul & Mark Warner, Opinion, How to Unite Privacy and Security—
Before the Next Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2015), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/opinions/how-to-unite-privacy-and-security—before-the-next-terrorist-attack/2
015/12/27/628537c4-a9b3-11e5-9b92-dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html?utm_term=.1be00f88e00c.
176
HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 17. Although the bill passed the House in
2016, the Senate did not vote on the bill so it is possible that this legislation will be re-visited
under the Trump administration. Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo PC, Federal
Cybersecurity Landscape for 2017, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.lexology.co
m/library/detail.aspx?g=045e64ca-81b2-4a05-ad9a-c493fe88d105. Another bill regarding
encryption was also introduced by Senators Burr and Feinstein around the same time;
however, this bill was highly criticized as it was considered essentially mandating tech
companies to compromise their own products for law enforcement and did not gain any
traction. See, e.g., Rainy Reitman, Security Win: Burr-Feinstein Proposal Declared “Dead”
for This Year, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 27, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2016/05/win-one-security-burr-feinstein-proposal-declared-dead-year.
177
The legislation is co-sponsored in the Senate by Senators Cory Gardner (R-CO), Brian
Schatz (D-HI), Susan Collins (R-ME), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Shelley Moore Capito (RWV), Angus King (I-ME), Dean Heller (R-NV), Bill Nelson (D-FL), Steve Daines (R-MT),
Michael Bennet (D-CO), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Rob Portman (R-OH),
Mike Rounds (R-SD), Thomas Carper (D-DE) and Gary Peters (D-MI). Sen. Warner Leads
Bipartisan Coalition to Create a National Commission on Digital Security, MARK R.
WARNER, http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=sen-warner-leads-bipartisancoalition-to-create-a-national-commission-on-digital-security_7 (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
In addition to Chairman McCaul, House co-sponsors are Representatives Jim Langevin (RRI), Patrick Meehan (R-PA), Mike Bishop (R-MI), Ted Lieu (D-CA), Will Hurd (R-TX),
Kathleen Rice (D-NY), Blake Farenthold (R-TX), Eric Swalwell (D-CA), Dan Donovan (RNY), Jerry McNerney (D-CA), Barbara Comstock (R-VA), Mimi Walters (R-CA), Ryan
Costello (R-PA), Dave Reichert (R-WA), Earl ““Buddy”“ Carter (R-GA), Peter King (RNY), Candice Miller (R-MI), John Katko (R-NY), Lamar Smith (R-TX), Barry Loudermilk
175
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Commission on Security and Technology Challenges (“the Commission”)
comprised of cryptologists, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and
others in the tech sector to propose solutions to the encryption challenges
presently faced by law enforcement.178
Senator Warner stated that the Commission would “strike an
appropriate balance that protects Americans’ privacy, American security,
and American competitiveness.”179 The Commission would achieve this
balance by: (1) assembling the brightest minds in the industry; (2) creating
an open national dialogue on the topic; and (3) moving quickly.180 The
Commission would also issue an interim report within six months after it
convened and then make recommendations to Congress within twelve
months.181
Although the Commission presents a possible compromise between the
tech industry and law enforcement, some civil liberty advocates vehemently
oppose the idea of the United States government meeting with technological
companies.182 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)183 believes that
a commission like that proposed by the Digital Security Commission Act
would simply continue an unnecessary conversation that was already hashed
out during the crypto wars of the 1990s.184 During the 1990s, Congress took
(R-GA), Martha McSally (R-AZ), Mike Rogers (R-AL), Jeff Duncan (R-SC), Susan Brooks
(R-IN), Mark Walker (R-NC), John Ratcliffe (R-TX), Betty and McCollum (D-MN). Id.
178
HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra note 101, at 17.
179
See Sen. Warner Leads Bipartisan Coalition to Create a National Commission on
Digital Security, supra note 177. FBI Director Christopher Wray has also discussed achieving
a “balance” between law enforcement and technology companies though Wray was not yet
able to articulate a solution for the issue. Christopher Wray, Dir., FBI, Statement Before the
House Judiciary Committee, ( July 12, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cf
m/releases?ID=C41F131A-D1E7-4E50-8E2B-1548A7EDCF17.
180
McCaul-Warner Commission on Digital Security, HOMELAND SECURITY COMM.,
https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/McCaul-Warner-Commission-On
e-pager-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
181
Id.
182
See, e.g., Erin Kelly, Electronic Privacy Advocates Split Over Encryption Commission
in New Bill, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/201
6/03/11/electronic-privacy-advocates-split-over-encryption-commission-new-bill/81600870
/. Similarly, FBI Director Wray’s comments on achieving a balance have also be criticized.
See Kevin Collier, The Encryption ‘Balance’ Trump’s FBI Candidate Wants Is
Mathematically Impossible, NY MAG. (July 12, 2017), http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/
07/the-encryption-balance-fbi-nominee-wants-is-impossible.html.
183
About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Jan. 13,
2017). The Electron Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) is a nonprofit organization that defends
civil liberties within the digital world including privacy, free expression, and innovation. Id.
Technologist, activists, and attorneys at EFF “defend free speech online, fight illegal
surveillance, advocate for users and innovators, and support freedom-enhancing
technologies.” Id.
184
Mark Jaycox, EFF Opposes McCaul-Warner Encryption Commission, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/eff-opposes-
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similar attempts to reconcile law enforcement’s ability to obtain information
with protecting the private tech industry, which led to no solutions.185 EFF
imagines that the Commission’s solution will merely be to create a key
escrow, which has already been a heavily rejected solution.186 Despite
opposition from the EFF, Apple has shown support for having a commission
between the tech industry and the federal government in an effort to foster a
national dialogue about encryption.187
The EFF also fails to consider the alternatives if a new encryption
discussion fails to occur between the tech industry and the federal
government in the United States. The American public will face an ongoing
controversy surrounding encryption without a dialogue, especially if another
domestic terrorist attack occurs.188 The Commission, or a similar
commission, will help establish that encryption technology is not the
problem, but the system that does not afford law enforcement a remedy is
the problem. The Commission will focus on fixing a broken system that has
public safety at odds with personal privacy.189 Further, Congress has limited
expertise in this new area of technology so a panel of experts within the
matter can better facilitate a more informed discussion to create a system of
regulatory oversight.190 As the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board stated,
A mature democracy—if America still is one—ought to be able to
work out these crucial matters of national security through
legislative deliberation. The public interest on encryption is best
served with a rational debate, not the ad hoc nuclear legal
exchange that the Administration is inviting.191
After meeting with experts in the field and better understanding the
technology, Congress would have a better path forward to knowledgably
adopt legislation and regulations. The Commission may even consider new
methods for law enforcement to access information on encrypted devices.
One approach could be a legal hacking regime.192 Another strategy that the
Commission may look to for regulating encryption domestically could be a
mccaul-warner-encryption-commission.
185
Id; see also supra Part III.B and accompanying text.
186
See Jaycox supra note 184; see also supra Part III.B and accompanying text.
187
Brian Bennett, Apple Backs Idea for Panel to Study Technology and National Security,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-apple-commission-2-20
160223-story.html.
188
See McCaul & Warner, supra note 175.
189
See Ryan Hagemann, The Path Forward on Encryption: The McCaul-Warner
Commission, LAWFARE BLOG (June 24, 2016, 2:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/pathforward-encryption-mccaul-warner-commission.
190
Id.
191
Joe Rago, Editorial, The FBI vs. Apple, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/the-fbi-vs-apple-1455840721.
192
Id.
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licensing scheme like the one implemented in Israel.193
B. Israel Strikes a Regulatory Balance Between National Security
and Individual Liberty for Encryption
The Israeli government needs highly secure encryption codes to protect
information within their own national agencies, but the Israeli government
also needs to incept and decrypt information regarding terroristic threats.194
The Israeli government decided to solve its own “crypto wars” by
implementing specific domestic encryption licensing methods.195 Under
Israel’s 1957 Control of Commodities and Services Law, the Israeli Minister
of Defense created an encryption-control licensing regime in 1974.196 Under
this encryption policy, Israel “aims to balance between national security
interests on the one hand and preserving competitive Hi-tech Industry on the
other, whilst enabling users to engage in encryption without over-burdening
restrictions.”197
The licensing scheme has three levels: a general license, a restricted
license, and a special license.198 Each level has its own requirements that an
applicant must meet to receive the license.199 When a company wants to
produce a new encryption product, the company must submit an application
193

See infra Part V.B.
Matthew Waxman & Doron Hindin, How Does Israel Regulate Encryption?,
LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015, 9:11 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-does-israelregulate-encryption.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Encryption Policy, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption
_Controls/Pages/Encryption_Policy.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
198
See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 130–31; see also Encryption Control in Israel,
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/def
ault.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). The general license is granted for all types of
encryption engagements, “with the exceptions of modification and integration.” GOLUMBIC,
supra note 71, at 131; see also Encryption Control in Israel, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE,
http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept.
26, 2017). A general license has no time limit. See also Encryption Control in Israel,
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/def
ault.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). Limited licenses, or restricted licenses, are more
restricted and granted only for “certain types of encryption measures and for certain
destination countries, based on criteria such as type of user.” GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at
131; see also Encryption Control in Israel, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE,
http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept.
26, 2017). Restricted licenses are valid only for one year. Encryption Control in Israel,
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/defau
lt.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017). Special licenses are issued only for a certain form of
encryption engagement and are also valid only for one year. See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71,
at 131; see also Encryption Control in Israel, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www
.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
199
Encryption Control in Israel, supra note 198.
194
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to the Supervisor of Military Export Controls in the Ministry of Defense to
receive the necessary license for the development of the encryption
measures.200 Once the encryption measures have been developed, an
applicant must also apply for an additional license for the production, export,
or sale of the encryption product.201 Throughout this process, the Ministry
may request information from the applicant, including a “working” version
of the product.202 The product is then either approved or rejected for a
license.203 Further, the license may not be infinite and when it expires, the
encryption developer must apply for a renewal.204
Israel’s current licensing system was updated in 1998, and the amended
language allows Israel to incorporate modern technology.205 The amended
language also contains a “Free Means” exemption, which allows for certain
encryption products to be decontrolled.206 Further, an “Internal Use” rule
allows for a company or individual to use encryption products without a
license for intra-company purposes.207 The Ministry of Defense also issued
a policy update in 2001, which relaxed some policy requirements such as
exempting certain license holders from saving sales data.208
By having this flexible system, Israel fosters open communication
between the private and public sectors.209 The Israeli government and its law
enforcement are constantly apprised of encryption advances.210 If the
government identifies new encryption technology that may threaten national
security or law enforcement, the program’s information-sharing scheme
allows the tech companies and the government to cooperate and reach
possible solutions and compromises.211 To date, no known law enforcement
action has taken place concerning violations of the encryption controls.212
Yet, this system seems to work since major technology companies, including
200

See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 132.
Id.
202
Id; see also Encryption Policy, supra note 197 (“[T]he applicant will be required to
submit to the Ministry of Defense the necessary technical information and/or a sample of the
product and/or any necessary additional information for completing the technical review.”).
203
See GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 132.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 128.
206
Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194. See also Free Means, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE,
http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Controls/Pages/FreeMeans.aspx (last visited
Sept. 26, 2017) (“Any Encryption Item that has received a general licence [sic] is declared a
‘“Free means’”, and as such requires no further licence [sic].”).
207
Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194.
208
Encryption Policy, supra note 197.
209
Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
201
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Apple, continue to comply and submit to the Israeli licensing system.213
According to available statistics, denials of licenses for encryption in Israel
are also rare and the average time for processing an application is a few days,
which further demonstrates the cooperation between the Israeli government
and technology companies.214 Israel’s encryption regulation reflects
encryption’s dual use nature215 by balancing between individual privacy and
national security.216
Israel faces similar threats of terrorism217 and public safety, but also
values user privacy. Israel’s regulation provides a good example of how to
balance competing interests within the United States. A study of Israel’s
encryption regulations may help the Commission and Congress develop their
own plans to develop encryption regulation within the United States. A
commission like that proposed by the Digital Security Commission Act is
the first step to foster a dialogue between tech companies and the United
States government. Commissions, however, are limited in duration.218 On
the other hand, if Congress legislated a licensing scheme similar to Israel’s,
the federal government could continue the open dialogue between the tech
industry and law enforcement.219 This persistent engagement would not only
lead to less animosity between the two entities, but would also create
solutions that would allow law enforcement to receive assistance regarding
encrypted information.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Farook’s iPhone has faded from the spotlight, the controversy
surrounding stronger private encryption products remains, and the FBI and
Apple continue to face legal battles.220 The American public and Congress
213

Id.
Statistics, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, http://www.mod.gov.il/English/Encryption_Cont
rols/Pages/Statistics.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
215
See supra note 102, and accompanying text.
216
GOLUMBIC, supra note 71, at 130.
217
Waxman & Hindin, supra note 194.
218
The Commission was projected to be a year long. See HOMELAND SEC. REP., supra
note 101, at 4.
219
Similarly, in India, the Observer Research Foundation, a public policy think-tank,
proposed a licensing scheme like Israel’s as an encryption policy due to the cooperative
exchange of information such a scheme offers. Bedavyasa Mohanty, Encryption Policy 2.0:
Securing India’’s Digital Economy, ORF SPECIAL REPORT 4 (2017), http://cf.orfonline.org/wp
-content/uploads/2017/05/ORF_SpecialReport_35.pdf.
220
The FBI recently sought to unlock an iPhone used by Dahir Ada, a terrorist that
committed a mass stabbing in a Minnesota Shopping Mall. Joe Uchill, FBI, Apple Eye New
Fight over Encryption, THE HILL (Oct. 10, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cy
bersecurity/299853-fbi-apple-eye-new-fight-over-encryption; Amy Forliti, FBI Still Trying to
Establish Motive in St. Cloud Mall Stabbing, TWIN CITIES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.twi
ncities.com/2017/02/17/fbi-still-trying-to-establish-motive-in-st-cloud-mall-stabbing/.
214
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must not forget the dueling interests that are at stake with encryption:
individual privacy and security, and national security and law enforcement
investigations. Instead of fighting a war, the federal government and private
sector companies should call a truce. By following a model like that
currently employed in Israel, an open discussion between the technology
sector and law enforcement can produce new solutions to old problems faced
by law enforcement.221 Until Congress provides the judiciary with clear
guidance, courts will continue to struggle to apply outdated legislation on
ever-increasingly powerful encryption technology to aid law enforcement.
After battling for years, the time has come for law enforcement and the
private sector to come together in a dialogue and create a legal scheme to
provide law enforcement with the assistance it so desperately needs.

221

Although encryption technology has evolved, the United States has struggled since the
1990s with solutions for regulating encryption. See supra Part III.B and accompanying text.

